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HPAI Preparedness and Communication Plan
APPENDIX 10. Surveillance for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Subtype H5N
Five strategies for collecting monitoring and surveillance data on Asian H5N1 virus in wild birds have been suggested (See An Early Detection System for Asian H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Wild Migratory Birds—U.S. Interagency Strategic Plan). The NPS is implementing investigation of morbidity and mortality events, at minimum. Determination of necessity for implementation of other surveillance strategies may be made on a site-specific basis.
Investigation of Morbidity/Mortality Events
Over 40 species of wild birds have been shown to be susceptible to infection with Asian H5N1 virus. While not all species infected necessarily exhibit disease, the current strain(s) of H5N1 circulating in Asia have been shown to cause morbidity and mortality in a wide variety of these species. The systematic investigation of morbidity and mortality events in wild birds to determine if Asian H5N1 is playing a role in causing illness and death offers the highest and earliest probability of detecting the virus if it is introduced by migratory birds into the United States. State natural resource agencies and Federal refuges and parks, primarily within the DOI’s U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service National Wildlife Refuge System and the National Park Service, are the principal authorities in a position to detect and respond to mortality events involving wild birds. Morbidity and mortality events involving wildlife are often detected by, or reported to, these agencies and entities. This strategy capitalizes on an existing morbidity/mortality program being conducted by DOI and its partners.
Surveillance in Live Wild Birds
This strategy incorporates sampling of live-captured, apparently healthy wild birds to detect the presence of Asian H5N1 virus. This effort will select bird species in North America that represent the highest risk of being exposed to, or infected with, Asian H5N1 virus because of their migratory movement patterns, which include birds that migrate directly between Asia and North America, or birds that may be in contact with species from areas in Asia with reported outbreaks. Should Asian H5N1 virus be detected in domestic birds in the U.S., sampling of wild birds in the flyway in the affected area may become a high priority as well. Data collected by organizations currently conducting research and monitoring for avian influenza in Alaska will be incorporated with additional bird captures as necessary to provide a broad species and geographic surveillance effort. This strategy capitalizes on research activities currently being conducted by DOI, USDA and their partners.
Surveillance in Hunter-killed Birds
Check stations for waterfowl hunting are operated by the US Fish and Wildlife Service and state natural resource agencies. Hunter check stations provide an opportunity to collect additional samples to determine the presence of HPAI and other subtypes of avian influenza viruses and supplement data collected during surveillance of live wild birds. As with surveillance of live wild birds, sampling of hunter-killed birds will focus on hunted species that are most likely to be exposed to HPAI in Asia; have relatively direct migratory pathways from those areas to the U.S. via Alaska or directly to the Pacific Coast; mix in Alaska staging areas with species that could bring the virus from Asia; or should HPAI be detected in domestic birds in the U.S., may mix with wild birds in the flyway of the affected area. Collection of samples from these species will occur at hunter check stations in the lower 48 states during hunting seasons in areas where these birds stage during migration or over-wintering.
Sentinel Species
Waterfowl, exhibition gamefowl, and poultry flocks reared on backyard premises have been used as sentinels for active surveillance for avian diseases of interest to the commercial poultry industry and regulatory agencies. Currently in Alaska, the State veterinarian uses targeted surveillance of domestic flocks at concentration points due to remote location of villages and lack of resources; enthusiasts travel to poultry exhibitions with birds from distant locations; and surveillance effectively covers a large geographic area. Enhancement of this approach would be valuable. However, placement of sentinel ducks in strategic locations may also prove useful. Placement of sentinel ducks has been used successfully for surveillance of diseases of importance to the poultry industry, including influenza A. Also, sentinel ducks in wild pelagic bird colonies improved virus detection rates fivefold, suggesting that this approach is advantageous in ecological studies.
Environmental Sampling
Avian influenza viruses are generally released by waterfowl through the intestinal tract and viable virus can be detected in both feces and the water in which the birds swim, defecate and feed. This is the principal means of virus spread to new avian hosts and potentially to poultry, other livestock, and humans. Analysis of both water and fecal material from waterfowl habitat can provide evidence of AI circulating in wild bird populations, the specific AI subtypes, levels of pathogenicity, and possible risks to humans and livestock. Monitoring of water and/or fecal samples gathered from waterfowl habitat is a reasonably cost effective, technologically achievable means to assess risks to humans and poultry
http://www.nps.gov/public_health/intra/ai/docs/Wild_App10.pdf
siehe auch:
http://www.usda.gov/documents/wildbirdstrategicplanpdf_seg0.pdf
APPENDIX 10. Surveillance for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Subtype H5N
Five strategies for collecting monitoring and surveillance data on Asian H5N1 virus in wild birds have been suggested (See An Early Detection System for Asian H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Wild Migratory Birds—U.S. Interagency Strategic Plan). The NPS is implementing investigation of morbidity and mortality events, at minimum. Determination of necessity for implementation of other surveillance strategies may be made on a site-specific basis.
Investigation of Morbidity/Mortality Events
Over 40 species of wild birds have been shown to be susceptible to infection with Asian H5N1 virus. While not all species infected necessarily exhibit disease, the current strain(s) of H5N1 circulating in Asia have been shown to cause morbidity and mortality in a wide variety of these species. The systematic investigation of morbidity and mortality events in wild birds to determine if Asian H5N1 is playing a role in causing illness and death offers the highest and earliest probability of detecting the virus if it is introduced by migratory birds into the United States. State natural resource agencies and Federal refuges and parks, primarily within the DOI’s U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service National Wildlife Refuge System and the National Park Service, are the principal authorities in a position to detect and respond to mortality events involving wild birds. Morbidity and mortality events involving wildlife are often detected by, or reported to, these agencies and entities. This strategy capitalizes on an existing morbidity/mortality program being conducted by DOI and its partners.
Surveillance in Live Wild Birds
This strategy incorporates sampling of live-captured, apparently healthy wild birds to detect the presence of Asian H5N1 virus. This effort will select bird species in North America that represent the highest risk of being exposed to, or infected with, Asian H5N1 virus because of their migratory movement patterns, which include birds that migrate directly between Asia and North America, or birds that may be in contact with species from areas in Asia with reported outbreaks. Should Asian H5N1 virus be detected in domestic birds in the U.S., sampling of wild birds in the flyway in the affected area may become a high priority as well. Data collected by organizations currently conducting research and monitoring for avian influenza in Alaska will be incorporated with additional bird captures as necessary to provide a broad species and geographic surveillance effort. This strategy capitalizes on research activities currently being conducted by DOI, USDA and their partners.
Surveillance in Hunter-killed Birds
Check stations for waterfowl hunting are operated by the US Fish and Wildlife Service and state natural resource agencies. Hunter check stations provide an opportunity to collect additional samples to determine the presence of HPAI and other subtypes of avian influenza viruses and supplement data collected during surveillance of live wild birds. As with surveillance of live wild birds, sampling of hunter-killed birds will focus on hunted species that are most likely to be exposed to HPAI in Asia; have relatively direct migratory pathways from those areas to the U.S. via Alaska or directly to the Pacific Coast; mix in Alaska staging areas with species that could bring the virus from Asia; or should HPAI be detected in domestic birds in the U.S., may mix with wild birds in the flyway of the affected area. Collection of samples from these species will occur at hunter check stations in the lower 48 states during hunting seasons in areas where these birds stage during migration or over-wintering.
Sentinel Species
Waterfowl, exhibition gamefowl, and poultry flocks reared on backyard premises have been used as sentinels for active surveillance for avian diseases of interest to the commercial poultry industry and regulatory agencies. Currently in Alaska, the State veterinarian uses targeted surveillance of domestic flocks at concentration points due to remote location of villages and lack of resources; enthusiasts travel to poultry exhibitions with birds from distant locations; and surveillance effectively covers a large geographic area. Enhancement of this approach would be valuable. However, placement of sentinel ducks in strategic locations may also prove useful. Placement of sentinel ducks has been used successfully for surveillance of diseases of importance to the poultry industry, including influenza A. Also, sentinel ducks in wild pelagic bird colonies improved virus detection rates fivefold, suggesting that this approach is advantageous in ecological studies.
Environmental Sampling
Avian influenza viruses are generally released by waterfowl through the intestinal tract and viable virus can be detected in both feces and the water in which the birds swim, defecate and feed. This is the principal means of virus spread to new avian hosts and potentially to poultry, other livestock, and humans. Analysis of both water and fecal material from waterfowl habitat can provide evidence of AI circulating in wild bird populations, the specific AI subtypes, levels of pathogenicity, and possible risks to humans and livestock. Monitoring of water and/or fecal samples gathered from waterfowl habitat is a reasonably cost effective, technologically achievable means to assess risks to humans and poultry
http://www.nps.gov/public_health/intra/ai/docs/Wild_App10.pdf
siehe auch:
http://www.usda.gov/documents/wildbirdstrategicplanpdf_seg0.pdf